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The passaae of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1973
has generated numerous issues in the area of labor-management
relationships, forcing both parties to balance their compe-
ting interests with respect to problems that may arise. To
a large degree, the balance has tilted in favor of manage-
ment preogatives, particularly in terms of negotiability
issues and the establishment of performance standards.
Federal employees, of course, retain grievance and appeal
rights. One of the purposes of the Act has been to stream-
line and to simplify the different appeals procedures which
may be utilized by federal employees. ~ The primary decision
for the employee to make will be whether to pursue an adverse
action grievance through arbitration or the Merit Syste s
Protection 3oard (hereafter MSPB or the Board). 4 In most
cases, this should not be a critical concern, since the
arbitrator is largely governed by the same criteria and stan-
dards that would govern the MSPB. 5 t^ Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority (hereafter FLRA ) ° will not review an adverse
action case, whether grieved through arbitration or the MSPB;
the following step in cases of this nature will be judicial
review through the Court of Claims or the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. The FLRA will remain as an
avenue of review in the case of other arbitration decisions
(for example, those based on negotiability issues) and may












"»>' or regulation or on other grounds similar to those applied
by Federal courts in private sector labor-management rela-
tions." Given this concern, it is clear that an arbitrator
must consider external law as part of the exercise of his
qauthority in the federal sector.
As aforementioned, in adverse action cases, the avenue
of appeal chosen by the grievant should not make a major
difference with respect to the relevant issue. For many
grievants, the appeal route chosen will be a matter of perso-
nal preference. Certain individuals may feel comfortable
with an arbitrator who might be regarded as being sympathetic
to the problems of the grievant. Other individuals may con-
sider th.it the mechanics of the MSPB in which a case is
heard by a presiding official (similar to an administrative
law judge), with the potential for review by the full Board,
is the preferred avenue because of the impression that there
are significant protections inherent in a forum tantamount
to a quas i
-
j
udicial form of review. This distinction may be
ephemeral at best, as a manifestation more of form, rather
than substance. Tn one respect, however, the choice may be
more significant; this is in the nature of an adverse action
grievance generated by the employee's failure to meet; a
performance standard. The MSPB and thn Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals have evidenced a willingness to examine the sub-
stance of a performance standard to ensure that it is based
on objective criteria, to the maximum extent feasible. ^®
4> *
o
The arbitrator, on the other hand, may shy away from such an
examination, feeling that ( s ) he may be invading management's
right in setting the standard.
Generally, however, the federal agency has remained domi-
nant in labor-management relations since the passage of the
Civil Service Reform Act. Such will be the theme of this
paper in examining three separate areas, focusing on the ar-
bitrator/MSPB relationship in adverse action and § 4303 cases.
Following a discussion of the purpose and relevant statutory
provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act, this paper will
first review management's right to take adverse action against
an employee. Such action might be taken pursuant to either
Chapter 43 of the Act for unacceptable performance or Chapter
75 of the Act for misconduct on the basis that such Chapter
75 action will promote the efficiency of the service. This
area has been unsettled over the last few years by differing
MSPB decisions, but has recently been addressed by the





.Whether Lovshin will remain the final word in this
area is somewhat speculative, since an appeal is currently
pending. A second area this paper will examine, again evi-
dencing the importance of agency discretion, will be the
agency's right to remove an individual for failure to attain,
or loss or, a security clearance. Attention will be given to
the recent MSPB decision of Egan v. Department of the Navy *•
-
which stresses the broad scope of agency authority in this
area, and prevents the MS?B from looking to the underlying
reason for the loss of clearance or from ordering the agency
to reinstate the clearance. Finally, this paper will examine
recent decisions concerning the establishment of employee
performance standards. This, again, may be an area where
agency discretion may be more strictly examined by the MSPB
(and the Federal Circuit Court) than by the arbitrator, there-
by requiring a high degree of accountability by the agency
in meeting the criteria of the Civil Service Reform Act when
adverse act ; on is contemplated.
II . THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 is an extremely com-
plex piece of legislation which has widely affected matters
relating to employee performance standards and grievance/arbi-
tration rights. For purposes of this paper, particular at-
tention must be given to Chapters 43 and 75, as well as
(briefly) Chapter 71.
A. Chapter 43
Section 4302 of Chapter 43 provides for the establishment
of a performance appraisal system by federal agencies, de-
signed in large measure to give renewed emphasis to merit
principles, with, perhaps, the hope of depol i t ici z ing employee
evaluations and the promotion process as a whole. In addition,
such a system would ideally provide an avenue to dismiss or
otherwise discipline substandard performers. Nonetheless, em-
W
'.J pioyee protections remain. Chapter 43 of the Act, in essence,
requires the federal agency to establish one or more perfor-
mance appraisal systems in which performance standards would
be utilized with respect to the various elements of an em-
ployee's position. 1 ^ These standards, as well as the critical
elements of each pos i t ion , must be communicated in writing to
each covered employee at the beginning of the appraisal per-
iod. 14 Each employee must be evaluated during the appraisal
period on the basis of such standards and will be assisted
when his/her performance is rated at an unacceptable level 15
W
Unacceptable performance, of course, is the basis for action
being taken under Chapter 43. If an employee's performance
is unacceptable, defined as a failure to meet established
performance standards in one or more critical elements of his/
her position, ° the agency may take such adverse action as
reassignment, reduction in grade, or removal. For purposes
of later analysis, a performance standard is defined as
the expressed measure of the level of achieve-
ment established by management for the duties
and responsibilities of a position or group of
positions and may include, but are not limited
to, elements such as quantity, quality, and
timeliness; a critical element, on the other
hand, is a component of an employee's job that
is of sufficient importance that performance below
the minimum standard established by management
requires remedial action and denial of a within-
grade increase, and may be the basis for removing
or reducing the grade level of that employee. Such
action may be taken without regard to performance
or other components of the job. LO
As such, unacceptable performance may constitute a fail-
ure of an employee to meet the performance standard for only
one critical element; this, in itself, Can be sufficient
grounds for taking action against an employee. Proceeding
under Chapter 43 for purposes of taking action may have both
positive and negative features for the agency and employee.
From management's viewpoint, an action taken pursuant tc
Chapter 43 need only be supported by substantial evidence. 1 ^
This constitutes, in theory, a low burden since substantial
evidence is defined as the "degree of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind, considering the record as a whole, might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion that the matter
asserted is true." -® As such, substantial evidence is suf-
ficient evidence that a reasonable person could come to a
certain conclusion. A review of a Chapter 43 action must
focus on whether there was sufficient evidence that a reason-
able person could, in essence, have reached the same determi-
nation as the agency. If the record as a whole contains
enough evidence that a reasonable person could determine that
the employee's job performance was unacceptable, then the
reviewing authority must sustain the agency's action even if
the reviewing authority, such as the MSPB, may have reached
a different conclusion.- 1
The employee faced with this low standard of proof may
take some solace in the procedural rights available to him/
her under Chapter 43. The rights list.-d in b U.S.C. § 4303,
applying to preference eligible and competitive service
personnel only, include:
uentitlement to 30 days advance written notice
of the proposed action which identifies spe-
cific instances of unacceptable performance
on which the action is based and the critical
elements of the employee's position involved
in each instance of unacceptable performance;
representation by an attorney or other repre-
sentative; a reasonable time to answer orally
and in writing; a written decision within 30
days after the expiration of the notice period
specifying the instances of unacceptable per-
formance on which the removal is based; freedom
from removal proceedings for unacceptable
performance occurring more than one year prior
to the date of the 30 day notice; an opportunity
to improve the employee's performance; and
extraction from one's record of all entries or
notations of removal proceedings if acceptable
improvement continues for one year from the date
of removal notice. -^
It is considered that the low burden of proof, coupled with
the procedural requirements, contribute to Chapter 43's
purpose of fostering a merit system in civil service personnel
matters . i
B. Chapter 75
Adverse action may be taken under Chapter 75, pursuant to
sections 7512/7513. Chapter 75 provides for adverse action to
be taken for misconduct or any reason other than unacceptable
performance. In order for adverse action to be taken, there
must be a nexus between the misconduct and the efficiency of
the service 23 T he term "efficiency of the service" is some-
what vague, but considers, in part, "the rights and obliga-
tions of the employer and employee, as well as equity, proce-
dural fairness, and other relevant facts and circumstances." ^4
As to what actions might give rise to discipline, the Federal
Personnel Manual lists such factors as recognizable offense.-:
7
against the employer-employee relationship; on or off the
job misconduct; inefficiency; or physical or mental inability
to perform the duties of the position." The appropriateness
of the penalty must be reviewed in determining whether the
discipline will promote the efficiency of the service. Such
factors utilized in determining the appropriateness of the
penalty include, but are not limited to, the nature and ser-
iousness of the offense; whether the offense was intentional
or inadvertent; the nature of the employment; the employee's
past disciplinary record; the effect of the offense upon
the employee's ability to perform in a satisfactory manner;
the impact of the offense on the agency's reputation; mitiga-
ting factors; the potential for the employee's rehabilitation;
and the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions
to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others
Procedural rights, while not as strict as under Chapter
43, are still available to the employee under Chapter 75.
An agency proposing adverse action against an employee under
Chapter 75 must give the employee the following rights:
d. at least 30 days' advance written notice,
unless there is reasonable cause to believe the
employee committed a crime for which imprisonment
may be imposed, stating the specific reasons for
the proposed action;
b. seven days' response time for the employee to
answer orally and in writing and to furnish affi-
davits and other documentary evidence;
c. the right to be represented by an attorney, or
other representative;
d. the right to a written decision and the specific
reasons therefor, at the earliest practicable date;
26
3
e. in addition, the agency may provide, fcy
regulation, for a hearing which may be in
lieu of, or in addition to, the opportunity
to answer, as noted above.
While such rights under Chapter ~5 incorporate the tradition-
al notice and opportunity to be heard, it is considered that
the procedural requisites of Chapter -43, including the oppor-
tunity to improve (more reasonable, given the nature of the
proposed action), as well as possible extraction of negative
material from one's file, may well inure more to the benefit
of the employee than do the Chapter 75 provisions.
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c)(1)(B), the standard of
proof under Chapter 75 is a preponderance of the evidence
standard - somewhat more strict than the substantial evidence
standard for Chapter 43 actions. Preponderance of the evi-
dence is "that degree of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind, considering the record as a whole, might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion that the matter asserted
is more likely to be true than not true." ^8 unlike the
unacceptable performance case, it is not sufficient in a mis-
conduct case for the record to show that a reasonable person
may have reached the same determination as tho agency. In-
stead, "the record as a whole must convince the MSPB that it
is more likely true than not that the employee was guilty as
charged . " ~ J
The differing bases for taking action under Chapters A3
^nd 75, along with the different standards of proof and em-
ployee procedural protections, might suggest that an agency
must utilize the appropriate Chapter in taxing a particular
action; that is, that an agency must proceed under Chapter 43
for unacceptable performance and under Chapter 75 for miscon-
duct. As will be examined, however, recent case law provides
broader agency discretion in this regard, consistent with
evident trends since the passage of the Civil Service Reform
Act .
C . Additional Provisions
Before engaging in such an analysis, however, two addi-
tioral provisions warrant review. Relating to the topic of
security clearances, Section 7532 (not in itself a part of the
Civil Service Reform Act) entitles the head of an agency to
suspend, and, following investigation, to remove an employee
when it is considered necessary or advisable in the interests
of national security. Within 30 days after suspension (and,
of course, before removal), an affected employee who has a
permanent or indefinite appointment, has completed a proba-
tionary period, and is a U.S. citizen, is entitled to:
a written statement of the charges
stated as specifically as security
considerations permit; an opportunity
to respond within 30 days thereafter;
a hearing at the employee's request by an
agency authority duly constituted for
this purpose; a review of the case by the
head of the agency or his designee, before
a decision adverse to the employee is
made final; and a written statement of
the decision of the head of the agency. 30
The interesting issue to be later examined is whether adverse








ken under either the 7512/7r-13 provisions or the 7531' provi-
sion.
Finally, with a view tcwird the analysis of performance
standards, Chapter 71, specifically $ 7106, warrants brief
consideration. Under 5 fJ.S.C. 3 7106 (a)(2), an agency nas
a broad right to hi assicn, and, if necessary, to take
disciplinary action ">•" .ist employees, as well as to direct
and as r ign work. Indeed, such broad rights include an agen-
cy's f '.edorn to identify critical elements of a position and
to e: t iblish performance standards. The language of § 7106
(b)(2), (3), however, has been construed to requir? the agency
to bargain on procedures to be observed in the development
and implementation of performance standards and critical
elenei.ts and on appropriate arrangements for employees ad-
versely affected by the application of performance standards
to them. * The arbitrator c iced with a negotiability issue
a:, to a performance standard is prevented from delving into
the suostance of a standard - that is, whether the critical
clemei t is not important enough to bo critical or the stan-
dard .s too strict - because to do so wouli invade the wide
? ~>
scale province of management rights. - The Federal Labor
Relations Authority, which lias jurisdiction in Chapter "1
matter**, has, in several decisions, upheld the primacy of
manage-ment rights in this area." The interesting concern is
whether in .in adverse action case (involving an individual
employee) relating tc performance standards, the arbitrator





ting his judgment tor that of management in setting the stan-
dard, a step that the arbitrator has been directed not to
-> 4take in labor-management negotiability issues. J ' Recent in-
dications are that the MS?B and Federal Circuit Court are
more willing to scrutinize the substance of a standard, while
the arbitrator is more concerned with fairness in applying
the standard. The arbi tra tor/MSPB distinction will provide
for some fertile analysis in the section of this paper rela-
ting to performance standards, with the stricter MSPB review
in this area being one of the few examples of the application
of some restraint on otherwise broad agency discretion.
III. AGENCY APPROACH UNDER CHAPTERS 43 AMD 75
A . MSPB Decisions
The purpose for taking action under Chapters 43 and 75
depends on whether the agency is assessing an employee's per-
formance (Chapter 43) or reviewing an employee's commission
of misconduct, which may warrant discipline to promote the
efficiency of the service (Chapter 75). Chapter 43 contains
stricter procedural employee safeguards, although the agency
has the benefit of a more relaxed burden of proof. Since
the performance criteria under Chapter 43 were designed to
foster a civil service system emphasizing merit
^
r inciples,
such criteria form a critical linchpin of the Civil Service
Reform Act. A main concern is whether the agency is chan-
neled into Chapter 43 for performance based actions or whe-
ther the agency may elect to take such actions under Chapter






evidence burden of proof. The significance of the issue is
related to the overall question of broad or limited agency
discret ion
.
Important MSPB decisions have varied in this respect. An
early MSPB case, Wells v. Harris , 35 presented authority for
broad agency discretion. Wei Is provided an examination into
the important statutory provisions of the Civil Service
Reform Act. The issue in Wells was whether, and under what
limitations, removal or demotion actions based on unacceptable
performance could be taken under § 4303 against employees for
whom a performance appraisal system had not yet been estab-
lished under § 4302 (the required date for such establishment
being 1 October 1981). Action in this case was taken pursuant
to interim regulations. The Board, in essence, determined
that such action could not be taken in the absence of a per-
formance appraisal system, and that the Office of Per-
sonnel Management's interim regulations in this area were
invalid. Wells also established , however, that agencies
need not wait until 1 October 1981 to proceed, because of av-
ailability of Chapter 75 for taking adverse action. ^
In the following years, Wells was given a broad reading
to allow agencies to take performance based actions under
either 5 U.S.C. § 4303 or § 7513, even though Wells only
addressed interim regulations before 1 October 1981 and did
not address whether an agency was precluded from using Chap-
ter 75 after a performance appraisal system had been devel-




behind the We lis decision for allowing the agency to proceed
under Chapter 75 for performance based purposes. The language
of section 7512, relating to penalties for most Chapter 75
adverse actions, clearly states that the provisions of Chapter
75 do not apply "to a reduction in grade or removal under
section 4303 of this title." -*7 j t ^ s especially troublesome
that the Board, in Wei is , after examining the legislative
history of Chapter 75, was aware of this concern, but nonethe-
less stated:
If an agency sees some advantage in pursuing
performance based action under Chapter 75, it
is not inconsistent with the Act so long as
the agency meets the higher burden of proof -
and the more difficult standard of demonstra-
ting that the action will promote "efficiency
of the service." There is not the slightest
evidence in the legislative history to suggest
that Chapter 43 was ever to be a refuge for
employees to escape Chapter 75. Chapter 43
originated as a relief measure for agencies
and it was enacted for that purpose. °
While such reasoning is certainly helpful to the agency, one
must question whether it is supported by any statutory basis.
In Gende v. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons , ^
the MSPB reevaluated the Wells decision. In Gende , the appel-
lant was demoted from his position as an Electrician Foreman
because of careless workmanship and failure to follow agency
policies. The adverse action was taken pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513; the appellant claimed that § 4303 should have been
utilized, conceivably to provide for the procedural protec-
tions which would have been available, such as an opportunity







cation of Chapter 43 to performance based actions a f ter L
October 1931, Gende reviewed the statutory and legislative
history in order to effect a determination.
In considering the purpose of enacting Chapter 43, inclu-
ding defects in old evaluation procedures, as well as the need
to simplify and expedite procedures, the Board found "persua-
sive indications in the legislative history that Congress
intended performance based removal and demotion actions to
be effected exclusively under Chapter 43 procedures." 40
Thi s , supposedly , would be consistent with the development of
a merit system. Benefits would flow to the agency through a
lesser burden of proof, while the employee's performance would
be weighed against an established performance appraisal sys-
tem with some inherent procedural protections. Furthermore,
Gende noted that since Chapter 75 specifically states that it
does not apply to a § 4303 removal, the interpretative maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" 4 * should be utilized
to determine that Chapter 43 be regarded as the exclusive
vehicle for performance based actions after 1 October 1981,
and that the rule be given prospective application.
One possible exception to this rule includes a situation
where an employee simply refuses to perform. Such an inten-
tional failure would be tantamount to misconduct and could be
punished through rhapter 75 adverse action procedures, assu-
ming that the intentional failure to perform was established
by a preponderance of the evidence. 42 The Board also noted
thrit Chapter 75 could bo utilized in cases where there would
15
be a substantial likelihood that a delay in removal for the
purpose of allowing time for improvement would result in
A 7injury, death, breach of security, or great monetary loss. J
In determining whether Chapter 75 actions are based on
performance or misconduct principles, the Board noted that
some presumptions would apply. Charges directly relating to
critical or non-critical elements of performance standards
would be regarded as performance based, subject to agency
rebuttal by a preponderance of the evidence. Secondly, the
Board would presume, subject to rebuttal by a preponderance
of the evidence, that charges relating directly to the appel-
lant's duties, responsibilities, work related tasks, func-
tions, and objectives would be performance-based in nature
and, therefore, could not be addressed under § 7513. ^4 The
Board also stated, in footnote 18:
One conseguence of the Board's ruling in
this decision and of the application of this
standard is that agencies may not take any
removal or demotion actions based on an
employee's non-critical elements. Such
performance based actions are not avail-
able under Chapter 75 and are not inclu-
ded in § 4303 since § 4303 actions must
be based on a failure to meet critical ele-
ments, 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (b) ( 1 ) (A) ( ii ) . In
such cases, however, if the agency were to
reassign the employee, any such reassign-
ment would not be appp.»lable to the Board
under Chapter 43. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4302 (a)
(3), (b)(6); 4303 (e). 45
It is considered that the Gende decision provided a re-
sponsible analysis of the statutory language of the Civil
Servce Inform Act, seeking to strike a balance between the






and the employee's concern for being evaluated pursuant to :n
established, rather than ad hoc appraisal system. Further-
more, the decision responded to the unanswered question i'.;
w 5 1 1
s
concerning the appropriate route for agencies to follow
regarding performance based actions taken after 1 October 1981
B . Lovshin
The vitality of the well reasoned Gende decision is in
serious jeopardy following the recent Federal Circuit Court
decision of Lovshin v. Deoartment of the Navy. 46 In this :ase,
an Electronics Engineer was removed from his position at
Maval Ship Weapons Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme,
California for inefficiency and poor workmanship under pro-
ceedings conducted pursuant to § 751 -i after 1 October 1981.
This adverse action was approved by the MSPB and Lovshin ap-
pealed, contending that a removal action for poor performance
was required to be taken under § 4303; the agency, on the
other hand, considered that it had the option to proceed under
either Chapter 43 or Chapter 75.
The Lovsh i n decision thoroughly analyzed Gende ' s purpose
of remaining consistent with the statutory language and merit
principles of Chapter 43. It considered, however, that the
Board, in Gende , by "believing it was necessary to eliminate
use of Chapter 75 totally in connection with performance based
actions against employees..., read into Chapter 75 a limita-
tion of sweeping proportions which Congress expressed nowhere
in the statute itself or in the legislative history." ^ 7
The court, in Lov.sh i n , determined that the Gende standard
17
would lead to unnecessary complexity in forcing an agency to
so strictly adhere to Chapter 43 appraisal principles, par-
ticularly since the development of appraisal systems is a ra-
ther new, and far from perfect undertaking. Such complexity
could result in a time-consuming procedure, alien to the
intent of Chapter 43, which would not well serve the public.
Finding that an agency may proceed under Chapter 75, as well
as Chapter 43, the court noted:
The somewhat greater burden on the employee under
Chapter 75 in this respect is balanced by the
greater burden on the agency under Chapter 75...
An employee sought to be removed under Chapter
43 is entitled to be rated on reasonable stan-
dards and to have the specific procedures of
Chapter 43 applied in connection with these stan-
dards. This protection is the guid pro quo for
the lesser burdens on the agency under that Chap-
ter. However, nothing in the statute or legis-
lative history indicates that an employee should
thereby be entitled to his position despite
serious performance deficiencies where an agency
can meet the heavy burdens of Chapter 75 and can
show substantive compliance with merit principles-.
We do not read Chapter 43 as implicitly eliminating
removal or demotion actions for performance rea-
sons under Chapter 75 48
The dissenting opinions focus on the clear statutory
language of § 7512(D), which states that Chapter 75 "does
not apply to a reduction in grade or removal under section
4303", as a solid basis for the well reasoned Gende decision. "
The benefit and burden analysis to both agency and employee
(expedite adverse action without resorting to ad hoc proce-
dures) under Chapter 43 should be considered in determining
the wisdom of proceeding under Chapter 43 F or performance






ence should be paid to an MS?3 having considerable expertise
in decisions of this nature.
Broad language similar to that in Lovshin was utilized in
several decisions allowing an agency to proceed under either
Chapter 43 or Chapter 75; such decisions include Turnage v.
United States D ^ and Hatcher v. Department of the Air Force . 1
In Ha tcher , an individual who was removed from his position
for poor performance as manager at the Tyndall Air Force Base
Officers' Club, pursuant to Chapter 75, contended that Chapter
43 should be the exclusive vehicle for such a removal. The
court, as did Lovshin two years later, used broad language in
asserting that there was no legislative basis to prevent the
agency from proceeding under Chapter 75 for performance based
adverse action matters, if the reguisite higher burden of
proof could be sav isfied. It should be noted that the above
cases were decided prior to the Gende ruling. Since the dis-
puted actions in these cases were taken during the interim
period before the agencies had established an approved
performance appraisal system, it is recognized that the courts
wore required to depend heavily on the W ells decision to sup-
port their reasoning. It can at least be said, however, that
the courts afforded appropriate deference to this MSPB deci-
sion, which hovsh i n failed to do relative to the Gende result.
The Lovsh i n decision's broad language might suggest that
the decision was not particularly well reasoned. Too little
attention appears to have been paid to the statutory distinc-
tions between Chapters -13 and T~> , with the aforementioned bono-
19
fits 2nd burdens available to the agency and employee. The
decision is certainly indicative of a recent trend of cases
which give the agency broader powers to take adverse action.
If the agency chooses to proceed under Chapter 75, of course,
it Must satisfy a higher standard of proof, an undertaking of
probable limited difficulty in return for extricating itself
from compliance with Chapter 43 procedural mandates. Such
increased agency discretion, however, may have interesting
ramifications. An agency pursuing a removal action under
Chapter 75 may find that the affected employee could be gran-
ted mitigating relief (demotion or suspension rather than
removal) which would not be available under Chapter 43. In
Lisiecki v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 3 - it was deter-
mined that the Board could reduce a penalty under Chapter 75,
but not under Chapter 43 because of its statutory basis, as
well as the language in Lovsh i n , that subsequent to compli-
ance with Chapter 43 procedures:
an agency may reduce in grade or remove an em-
ployee for receiving a rating of "unacceptable"
in u single critical element. No more is re-
quired of the agency; that is, a removal or demo-
tion on the basis of an "unacceptable performance"
rating on a "critical element" is not subject to
any of the substantive or procedural requirements
of Chapter 75. ,3
It should also be noted that demotion and removal are the only
sanctions available under Chapter '13.
It should further be noted that it is incumbent on the
a jency to make a choice at the outset as to which procedure to





an agency took adverse action against an employee pursuant
to Chapter 43. When the court found the performance standard




the case be remanded to the MS?3 for consideration under
Chapter 75. The court refused to do so, noting the separate
guidelines established by Chapters 43 and 75, and also deter-
mined that remand to the Board would be inappropriate, since
if the standard had been properly established at the outset,
adverse action might not have been necessary." Although
remand to the Board was rejected, the court, citing Lovshi n ,
left open the question as to whether the agency could insti-
tute a Chapter 75 action, utilizing the procedures contained
therein, "based on the same or a similar set of operative
facts." 56




' the Federal Circuit Court examined an MSPB case
in which the presiding official conducted a hearing regarding
an individual's removal for failure to complete a portion of
a training program. T:te presiding official regarded the case
as a Chapter 43 proceeding, and conducted the hearing as
though Chapter 43 principles should apply, including the
agency having the burden of proving the reasons for the appel-
lant's removal by substantial evidence. The action, however,
was later recharacterized and sustained by the presiding of-
ficial (one month after the record closed), as a Chapter 75
action because the agency had failed to introduce appellant's
performance standards, and did not establish which duties
21
were critical elements. 3 3 Although the 3oard sustained the
presiding official's action, the Federal Circuit Court vaca-
ted and remanded, stating that a recharacterization of the
proceeding after the record hac closed was inappropriate,
with "after-the-fact switches being inherently unfair and
governing considerations between the two chapters being
distinct." J " Such distinctions include the different bur-
dens of proof in each chapter; the need to show an efficien-
cy of the service under Chapter 75; and the unavailability of
penalty mitigation under Chapter 43 (Lisiecki, supra ) . ^0
The Wi lson rationale triggers one final consideration
before concluding the analysis in this area. It will even-
tually be determined that the MSPB and courts- are more
strictly analyzing the content and validity of performance
standards in Chapter 43 adverse action cases. Given the
broader agency discretion granted in Lovsh i n to proceed
under either Chapter 43 or Chapter 75, one may question
whether more agencies will proceed under Chapter 75 if more
performance standards under Chapter 43 are deemed invalid.
Such a discretionary move by the agency would have to be
balanced against the stricter burden of proof, preponderance
of the evidence, and the more ready availability of nitiga-
ting action by the MSPB, pursuant to Chapter 75, as noted in
L i s iec'< i .
IV . LOSS 07 SI CUR IT",' CI.EATWTn
An additional recent development, again indicative of
broadened a^^ncy discretion, deals with whether t'.ie MSPD
•
can r aview the reason for an agency's revocation or denial of
a security clearance. The MSPB will usually have jurisdiction
in such cases because the loss or revocation of a clearance
will, in many instances, require that adverse action be taken
pursuant to Chapter 75. An important MSPB decision in this
area, E:;an v. Department of the N'avv ,"^ is veil reasoned,
relying on appropriate precedent. It should, unlike Lovshin ,
be relied on with some certainty by both the agency and the
employee under similar circumstances.
A . Egan - Basic Holdin g
In this case, Egan was removed from his position as a
Laborer Leader with the Trident Naval Refit Facililty, 3angor,
3remerton, Washington since he was unable to obtain the secu-
rity clearance which was a necessary condition of his employ-
ment. Egan appealed the adverse action to the Board's Seattle
Regional Office. The presiding official, citing Hos':a v.
Department of the Army J - and Do
,
hno 1 ; icz v. Department of the
Uny °- found that the agency's denial of the clearance was
unreasonable, and reversed the agency's action.
The Board, on appeal by the agency, determined that while
it has jurisdiction over adverse actions, it had no authority
to review the agency':; stated reasons for the security clear-
ance determination. Clearly, the 3oard cannot require restor-
ation of the clearance. Instead, the Board's action is limi-
ted to a review of the agency procedures to ensure compliance
with due process, with the flour d stating that:
W e further hold ths t the minimal d u e a r o c 9 s
s
rights that must be afforded the employee
upon the agency's denial or revocation of a
security clearance are: notice of the denial
or revocation; a statement of the reason(s)
upon which the negative decision was based;
and an opportunity to respond.
The nature of the 3oard review in such cases,
therefore, will be limited to determining
that the agency has established the following:
il) the requirement of a security clearance
for the position in question; (2) the loss or
denial of the security clearance; (3) and the
granting of minimal due process protections
to the employee.
Finally, it was concluded thac Sections 7512 and 7513 may be
utilized in such cases and that the summary provisions of
5 U.S.C. 3 7532 need not be relied on.
3 . Rationale - Analogy L^- Military Decisions
The Board's decision is certainly consistent with federal
case law, as v/ell as some of its own previous decisions. The
Department of Defense has established strict guidelines rela-
ting to security clearances, with such clearances granted if
clearly consistent with the interests of national security. ^
The Board's evaluation of the reasons behind granting or
revoking a security clearance would be inconsistent with the
proper deference paid to those responsible for decisions of
tins nature, with the best analogy being deference to natcers
normally within military purview. 66 There has consistently
been a general reluctance to interfere in military matters,
unless an official has acted outside of his power or has
improperly applied his own regulations. Court review will




iiea rignt or tne exhaustion or intrasarvica corrective mea-
sares. - J The courts will not become involved in locking oe-
h i nd tne reasons for an individual's non-selection for promo-
tion, - or an individual's dismissal from a Reserve unit
(resulting in loss of a civilian job), so long as the agency
has si stained its burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidc ce that the adverse action taken was based on a matter
within the individual's control. ^ The refusal of courts to
r e v 1 e *.. internal military decisions is, as noted by Eqan , •
clear. y similar to a desire not to become involved in a review
of reasons for denying a security clearance. Indeed, even
beyond the military, internal agency decisions are generally
accorded great deference. In Bacon v. Department of Housing
and I rban Development , 12 the MSPB refused to look behind the
stated reasons for an agency's reduct ion- i n-f orce decision.
It o.iould also be noted, of course, that an arbitrary agency
action in itself, without some showing of an adverse effect,
is ':ot reviewable by the courts or the MSPB. ^ similarly,
the MSP3 would not have jurisdiction to review a constitu-
tional claim relative to an employee's religious objections
to ^n insurance coverage package developed by the agency. '
Indeed, the Hq m refusal to scrutinize the reasons for a
security clearance denial is consistent with previous 3oard
decisions not to look behind a conviction to reexamine guilt
or innocence, } or to look behind the reasons for an attorney's
1(> In Schaffor v. Department of the; 3 r decert
i
Tication







tion after he vas dismissed from the Air Force Reserves for
being overweight. Again, the Board refused to look behind
the reasons for the agency action or to consider any affirma-
tive defenses, once the agency was able to prove the reasons
for its action, with such reasons being within the individu-
al's control. This, of course, remains consistent with the
traditional reluctance of a non-military authority to review
the actions of a military body.
With the Board's concern "against treading into areas
which are sensitive by virtue of their national security im-
7 flplications", ° one must consider why the presiding official
in Egan relied on Hoska and Bogdanowicz to provide for a re-
view of security matters in the first place. A clear examina-
tion of Hoska , however, reveals no inconsistencies. The
Hoska decision considered a removal action following a secur-
ity clearance revocation. The presiding official sustained
the agency action, which resulted in the final Board decision
because of the appellant's failure to seek full review by the
MSPB within the statutory time frame. On appeal to the court,
it was determined that the agency action was based on unsub-
stantiated hearsay, with no rational nexus shown between the
employee's conduct and his inability to safeguard classified
information. '" As such, the Hoska decision simply reempha-
sized the need to find a rational nexus based on appropriate
evidence in a § 7513 action, and did not constitute authority
for Board examination into the reasons behind a security












reiving on Hoska as a basis for looking behind the reasons
for loss of clearance './as, in effect, overruled by the Eqan
on ...decision. w Also now of questionable value is tne decision
of Doe v. National Security Agency , °^ in which the 3oard
determined that a presiding official appropriately concluded
that unless an agency invoked sections 7513 and 7532 for
national security reasons, then the Board had the authority
in a removal appeal to order reinstatement of a federal em-
ployee to his former position regardless of whether the posi-
tion required a security clearance.
C. Section 7513 or 7532?
As previously noted, adverse action is normally taken
under section 7513, although the provision exists for sum-
mary action by an agency head when consistent with national
security grounds (§ 7532). Indeed, section 7512(A) excludes
from Board review actions otherwise taken pursuant to section
7532. While clearance cases are related to national security,
t h e E ;; a
n
d ecision determined that in such cases there is no
basis for requiring the exclus i ve use of the summary § 7532
provision, which places great discretion on the head of the
agency to invoke suspension and, following investigation,
termination when necessary in the interests of national secur-
er ->ity. In Cole v
.
Young ,"- the Supreme Court determined that
the term "national security'' would apply "only to those
activities of the Government that are directly concerned with
the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or for-
eign aggression.. ^-^c\ not those which contribute to the
27
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did not rise to
Certainly, the situation manifested in Eqan
the serious security concerns defined in
Cole , and, therefore, the agency could pursue an adverse action
of this nature under § 7513.
The use of 5 7513 rather than § 7532 inures to the benefit
of the employee since the agency, in seeking to discipline,
:
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a nexus be-
tween the "misconduct" involved and the efficiency of the ser-
vice. As previously noted in Schaffer v. Department of the
Air Force , an individual was removed from the Air Force Re-
serves for being overweight, thereby resulting in loss of his
civilian job. In response to his claim of lack of nexus, the
•'Board determined that such a nexus was shown in that having
civilian employees retain a Reserve affiliation is related to
'the agency's purpose of providing active Reserve units with a
cadre of Reservists who are fully trained in supplying support
services; as such, dismissal from civilian employment for fail-
ure to maintain an active Reserve membership promotes the
efficiency of the service. ^ While the denial (or loss) of a
security clearance, as manifested by Eqan , might not be tan-
tamount to misconduct, the agency would still be reguired to
prove a nexus between the loss of the clearance and the effi-
ciency of the service. J To establish a nexus, there must
be proof that the employee reguired a security clearance in
performing his duties or responsibilities and that such duties
would include access to either classified information or mater-
10
^•^
lal. 3 ° If these conditions are inapplicable, then the employ-
ee would not require a clearance and the nexus between the
revocation of the clearance and the efficiency of the service
will not have been established. ' The absence of any recent or
significant exposure to classified information or areas, how-
ever, may not necessarily be fatal to the proof of nexus; the
agency may still prove its case by demonstrating a genuine
need to have the position able to deal with either classified
information or restricted areas. °
D . Remedy
As noted, Eqan , consistent with previous MSPB and federal
decisions, determined that while the Board cannot look to the
underlying reasons for the clearance denial, it may ensure
that the agency is complying with its own regulations in affor-
ding the appellant procedural due process rights when making
a negative security clearance determination. Failure to af-
ford such due process rights would result in a reversal of
the adverse action and an order that the agency restore the
appellant to pay status. y
F. . Rami f ica t i ons
As does hovshi n , the Eqan decision serves to strengthen
agency discretion in adverse action cases. Unlike Lovshi n
,
it is considered that Eqan is based on a consistent applica-
tion of previous federal court and Board decisions which
broadly defer to agency decisions in matters of this nature,
so long as the agency follows its own regulations in affording
the affected individual procedural due process rights. The
29
E g a n decision nay be utilized to allow agancias to operate
more swiftly and with more certainty in sensitive cases, and
certainiv aooears to strike an aoorooriate balance between




While agency discretion was reemphasized in the Chapter
43/75 ( Lovshin ) and security clearance ( Eqan ) situations, a
series of recent federal and MSP3 decisions may reflect a
more strict examination of agency action with respect to
the establishment of performance standards. As previously
noted, Chapter 43 provides for the agency establishment of
performance appraisal systems no later than 1 October 1981.
Of particular concern is 5 U.S.C § 4302 (b)(1), which requires
the agency to establish, in writing:
performance standards which will, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible, permit the accurate eval-
uation of job performance on the basis of ob-
jective criteria (which may include the
extent of courtesy demonstrated to the public)
related t 1 the job in question for each employ-
ee or p^oition under the system
As will be seen, the language "objective criteria to the
maximum extent feasible" has provided some headaches for
agencies tasked by the Civil Service Reform Act with this
relatively new and complex requirement.
The most interesting concern with respect to this stricter
scrutiny of performance standards deals with the affected em-
ployee's choice when pursuing a grievance. An employee







concerning any matter relating to the employment of the employ-
ee" or "any complaint concerning the effect or interpretation,
or a claim of breach, of a collective bargaining agreement or
any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication
of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of em-
q i
• ployment." ^ L An employee may elect to pursue a grievance
through the arbitrator or the MSP3, but not both. * Arbitra-
tors have traditionally been reluctant to become involved
i
' with the substance of a performance standard in section 7106
negotiability issues because in those cases, subject to re-
', view by the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the FLRA has
made it clear that management has the preogative to decide
jj
i what elements are critical. -* While an adverse action case
' presents different issues than a negotiability case (indeed,
"
!
I; there is no FLRA review in adverse action cases)" , the
!'
arbitrator may still be cautious. If the issue is whether an
employee's performance standards were based on objective cri-
teria, to the maximum extent feasible, "the line between deci-
ding that issue and the substitution of the arbitrator's
judgment for that of management in setting standards may be a
very fine line indeed." 95 The arbitrator will try to refrain
from crossing the line and entering into an area proscribed
by FLRA decisions. 96
In this section of the paper, a brief examination will be
made of FLRA decisions emphasizing the primacy of management
rights in negotiability issues, which have caused arbitrators
to refrain from examining the substance of a standard, and to
31
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Following this analysis, a more detailed examination will be
given to the role of the MS?3 and courts in analyzing the
substance of the standard in adverse action cases. Two ques-
tions may then be presented for brief consideration:
1. Will more grievants elect MSPB review rather
than arbitration in Chapter 43 performance cases
because of the MSPB's willingness to analyze
the standard in more detail?
2. Will agencies be more likely to bypass Chap-
ter 43 and proceed under Chapter 75, on an effi-
ciency of the service basis, albeit with the
higher burden of proof?
\
. FLRA Decisions
When an agency is tasked with developing performance stan-
dards, the union often submits its own proposals, in the hope
that the agency will enter into negotiations with the union
concerning the standard in question. The unions' efforts in
this area have, to a large degree, been fruitless. The
Federal Labor Relations Authority has generally maintained
that 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) provides for broad management discre-
tion to direct and assign work, including the development of
quantitative performance standards. Many union proposals are
designee to set quantitative levels, with an eye toward easing
the burden on employees. In the important FLRA decision of
National TreL-.urv Employees Union and Department of the Trea-
07
sury, Bureau of the Public Debt , a union proposal as to the
number of batches an accounts maintena'ce clerk was required to
process in order to retain the position and attain a within-*
grade step increase (nine batches per hour) was not considered
32
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to be procedural in nature. Such a proposal would, instead,
specify a critical element of the job, as well as the standard
required for retention. Since the proposal required the agen-
cy to bargain as to the quantity, quality, and timeliness stan-
dards which it must establish in making work assignments and
directing employees, it interfered with statutory management
rights, under § 7106
.
"^Simi lar ly , a union proposal to estab-
lish the level of output which an agency would be required to
accept as a satisfactory quantity of production in determining
grade retention and within-grade increases was considered to
limit management rights in N T E U , Chapter 7 2, and IRS, Austin
Service Center . ™
In general, proposals restricting management in the sub-
stantive establishment of performance standards will be
deemed to violate management's right to assign work and to
direct employees. For example, the attempt to restrict criti-
cal elements to those factors which are grade controlling
components of a job have been deemed to interfere with manage-
ment prerogatives. 1^ In NTEU and Internal Revenue Service , 1 ^ 1
a union proposal to set standards concerning incentive pay
was deemed to interfere with management's right to encourage
and reward successful performance. In American Federation of
Government Employees, LocjI 1917 and United States Cmmiqration
and Naturalisation Service
,
*• 2 a dj. S p U t,e arose between the
union and the agency regarding the agency's development of
numerical performance standards for rating the work perfor-
mance of criminal i nves
t
iqa tors in a certain job element. The
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arbitrator determined the grievance to be arbitrable and den-
ied the grievance as to the establishment of numerical stan-
dards. The FLRA determined that the grievance was not even
arbitrable in the first place because the union was challen-
ging management's right to direct and assign work: under § 7106
(a)(2)(A) and (B).
In a recent ninth circuit decision, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Author i ty , ^®^ the
primacy of management rights was reemphasi zed , as the follow-
ing union proposals were deemed to be non-negotiable:
(b) Critical elements shall only be elements
which are in fact critical to the perfor-
mance of the job.
(d) Critical elements shall be mutually exclu-
sive and explicitly defined. Critical
elements shall not be defined or applied
in a manner to be at cross purposes with
each other.
(f) The line between unacceptable and minimally
acceptable performance shall be defined
precisely and distinguished. 1(-1 ^
The Court considered that such proposals, while not dictating
"the precise content or contours of a critical element or
performance standard, nevertheless restrict agency discretion
by mandating some substantive criteria fr.r the establishment
of critical elements or performance standards." 10j These
proposals would violate management rights in that they would
allow an arbitrator to substitute his/her judgment for that
of management in evaluating a standard, rather than merely
providing for "the procedural review of management's applica-
tion of its own critical eleuonts." 10 ^
3 1





While the agency has the right to direct and assign work,
it must, under 5 U.S.C.§ 7106 (b)(2), bargain on procedures
to be observed in the development and implementation of per-
formance standards and critical elements and, pursuant to
§ 7105 (b)(3), on appropriate arrangements for employees
adversely affected by the application of performance standards
to them. ®' In addition, proposals which apply to predicting
performance concerning employees in career ladder positions
do not violate management rights to assign work, since the
criteria in such proposals serve only as a guideline for pre-
dicting employee performance at the higher grade level rather
108 w-;
v.'
The procedures to be observed by the agency, pursuant to *$
<:•
k
§ 7106 (b)(2), are often spelled out in collective bargaining
J:
agreements, the Federal Personnel Manual, and the agency's
i
own regulations. As such, an arbitrator could, pursuant to
' § 7106 (b), direct relief requiring the agency to comply with
the procedures listed in any of the above sources. 1^ As such,




AFL-CIO, 11U there was no improper interference with
the right to assign work where the arbitrator rescinded a /.'
disciplinary transfer which was not for just cause, in accor- K'




Nonetheless , as noted in the ninth circuit decision,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority
, arbitrators are discouraged from scrutinizing the




their judgment for that of management. Arbitrators have
found most union grievances regarding performance standards to
be non-arbitrable, unless there has been a contract viola-
tion,--1-- such as by implementing standards in the middle of an
appraisal period, lj or by utilizing standards which were
never written or communicated, as required by statute. -^
. Employee claims that the established performance standard did
not provide a fair, objective means of evaluation have gener-
ally been defeated, if the jobs were prof essional , requiring
personal judgment and not subject to quantifying standards. ^
j
As to such positions, agencies are granted a certain degree
j
of discretion, since it is often necessary to exercise sub-
ji
.jective judgments.
A review, therefore, of the FI-RA and arbitration decisions
1
1
1 reemphasize the primacy of management rights in accordance
1
with 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (a), with the limited exceptions of the
agency being required to bargain as to the application of
such standards, and the arbitrator reviewing such application,
as well as ensuring that no contractual provision has been
, » A 116violated .
Perhaps the best statement concerning the relationship
between arbitral remedies and § 7100 is as follows:
It can be said with certainty that a remedial
order flatly prohibiting agency management
from exercising any of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7106 will be found deficient by
the FLRA. At the other end of this spec-
trum, remedies ' Tely requiring management
to comply with .ontractual or regulatory provi-
sions that mandate the procedures whereby that
Section 7100 authority is to be exercised are
30
likely (if not certain) to be sustained
upon review.
Therefore, the !;ey to a proper rernedv formu-
lation would appear to oe reliance by the
arbitrator upon such regulatory or contrac-
tual procedures in the formulation of reme-
dies. This, of course, assumes that the
regulation or, more likely, the contractual
provision relied upon does not constitute
an absolute bar to management action... H'
3 . MSPB Decisions in Performance Standard Cases
In several cases, the MSPB has reviewed performance stan-
dards when an employee's failure to meet such standards has
resulted in adverse action being taken. 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1)
requires that performance standards be formulated "which will,
to the maximum extent feasible, permit the accurate evaluation
of job performance on the basis of objective criteria."
Standards must also be reasonable, realistic, and clearly
stated in writing. Although there is no requirement that
quantitative criteria be established, the MSPB has focused on
§ 4302(b)(1) to analyze the standard vis-a-vis the employee
in a stricter manner than the FLRA would provide for in nego-
tiability issues. While some would contend that the MSPB is
merely scrutinizing the fair application of the standards, it
is assorted that the Board is doing much more.
1 . Absolute Standards
Perhaps the bellweather MS PC decision regarding perfor-
mance standards is Callaway v. Department of the Armv ,^^
which challenged an agency's promulgation of an absolute stan-
dard, in this instance, the fact that one established incident
of discourtesy would result in unacceptable performance as to
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that element. While C 2 1 1 3
w
2 v p.oted that the statute does not
forbid the establishment of an absolute standard, the use of
such a standard must promote a statutory purpose. The main
concern with absolute standards is that since they provide
that one incident of poor performance will result in an unsat-
isfactory rating on a job element, they only provide a basis
for taking adverse action against an employee and do not allow
for evaluating and rewarding an employee who exceeds the
performance standard. 119 As such, Callaway formulated the
rule that while the establishment of absolute performance
standards generally constitute an agency abuse of discretion,
such standards would be appropriate in some positions where
situations may develop that could result in death, injury,
breach of security, or great monetary loss from a single fail-
ure to meet the performance standard. 120 The application of
an absolute standard to "courtesy" clearly did not rise to the
above cited test.
An additional significant factor in Ca 1 la way is that the
Board placed the burden on. the agency to show that its stan-
dards have met statutory requirements and do not constitute
an abuse of d i scret ion
.
1 - 1 This modified the holding of




which determined that an action under § 4303 would be reversed
if the agency has "abused its discretion so as to cause harm
to the employee to whom the standards were applied." ** J As
established by C a 1 1 a w a y , the harmful error test is not appli-
cable to the issue; harmful error is generally defined as one
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"by the agency in the application of its procedures which, in
the absence or cure of the error, might have caused the agen-
cy to reach a conclusion different from the one reached. The
ourden is on the appellant to show that based upon the record
as a whole, the error was harmful, i.e., caused substantial
harm or prejudice to his/her rights." ^--^ With tiiis harmful
^rror test no longer applicable, in accordance with Callavav ,
this burden shifting from appellant to agency constitutes an
important factor in evaluating the substance and application
of agency performance standards.
In more recent cases which challenged a standard as being
absolute, the Board has usually looked at whether the agency
abused its discretion in setting the standard. The nature of
the employee's position has generally been considered, as
well as whether it was possible for the appellant to have
exceeded the standard with exemplary performance, a concern





J an absolute standard could not be justi-
fied when the position involved easily identifiable tasks and
the duties were not necessarily subjective in nature. In
Komara v. Veteran's Adm i n i s t r 1 1 i on , ^ -" a standard requiring
a medical technologist to accurately perforin patient tests
within the time frame established by the supervisor was
deemed to be an improper absolute standard. The agency claim
that some of the tests (STAT tests) were related to Life-
threatening situations did not bring that standard within the










card had applied to all cescs; furthermore, the failure to
perform even all STAT tests was not considered 1 1 fe- threaten-
ing or harmful to patients in this situation when it was
determined that the time limits were designed to avoid incon-
venience to the patients who were required to await the test
results. 1 -' To come within the Cal lawa v exception, "the
agency must tailor the standard to apply only to situations
where a single failure to meet the standard could result in
death or injury, not merely to encompass such situations.'' 12 '
Clearly, if there is a possibility of exceeding perfor-
mance requirements, then an absolute standard will not result
In Fuller v. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Ser -
1 ?Qvice , " it was held that the standard regarding non-delivery
of mail was not absolute, when it could be determined that
the employee knew that a consistent failure to distribute all
mail each day would constitute unacceptable performance,
rather than the simple failure to deliver one piece of mail.
More importantly, a grievant's challenge that a standard is
absolute may very well fail in situations where it is diffi-
cult to precisely develop a standard. For example, in
Stubblefield v. Department of Commerce , ^0 an individual
was demoted from his position as a Physical Scientist for
the Oceanic/Atmospheric Administration, because of unsatis-
factory ratings with respect to the following three critical
elements
:
a. Submit a biannual report to the supervisor
by March 15, 1934. Reports must be succinct, on




















adjudged by the supervisor.
b. A prepared research paper must be of suf-
ficient quality to pass peer review and be
approved for submission by the supervisor and
Director by March 15, 1934.
c. Material must be submitted on time (without
prior approval) and be of high quality so as to
require few major revisions after review. 1^1
While the presiding official felt that improper absolute stan-
dards had been established, the Board concurred with the
agency's claim that the nature of the position was not sus-
ceptible to a mechanical rating system, thereby making it
difficult to develop precise standards. In addition, the
Board determined that the standards in this case were indeed
objective, to the maximum extent feasible; that the standards
could be exceeded; and that the standards were not negative
in nature. Similarly, in Faust v. Smithsonian , 132 an indiv-
idual was removed as a microbiologist for unacceptable perfor-
mance in planning and conducting an agency's long term micro-
bial research program for phy toplankton . The standard was not
considered to be improperly absolute, since the nature of the
job was not susceptible to strictly objective, numerical ra-
tings. The performance standards were not unreasonable in
including the judgment of trained fellow scientists in
assessing performance; indeed, a subjective posture may be
used "»."hen a position involves research and judgment requiring
the proficiency of a trained, scientific professional." ^
As such, while Ca
1
laway provided for some scrutiny into
whether a performance standard is improperly absolute, the
41
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standard will generally survive if an appellant was able to
exceed the published standard with superior performance, and
the nature of the position was such as to make it difficult
to develop criteria in a purely quantitative, mechanical, and
objective fashion.
2 . Objective to the Maximum Extent Feasible
Somewhat related to the Cal laway issue of avoiding the
setting of an absolute standard, the agency, in compliance
with 5 U.S.C. § 4302 (b)(1), is tasked with ensuring that
standards are objective, to the maximum extent feasible.
This does not necessarily require that quantitative criteria
be established as to each performance standard, since the
nature of many positions may require subjective judgments by
an employer or supervisor. In Shuman v. Department of the
Treasury
,
^ -^ a revenue officer who failed to perform accepta-
bly as to one of four critical elements was deemed to have
performed unacceptably as a whole, thereby justifying remo-
val, even though quantitative criteria had not been estab-
lished. In this particular case, the agency had developed a
nine-component performance standard in connection with an
element entitled "Application of Collection and Investiga-
tive Skills." The Board noted that the standard in this
instance was very complex, encompassing a wide range of du-
ties. As such, it would not have been feasible to require
the agency to state an exact number of errors which would
warrant an unacceptable performance rating on the element. "
Indeed, unacceptable performance may consist of a failure to
42
W? ».•».•«»*».«.,".». 1 . x. iV'-lk ti. . . ."» .>.•»-> .'.I.I, • j j '.» * * •-* •-» •* *.»:j •«» •»• •. .-. f. t. t. +. <. r* 'O. *. »•. <\ ~-\ i
••*%
I •*:<
meet a performance standard for a single, critical element, so
long as the agency presents substantial evidence that the
performance warranted an unacceptable rating on the element as
a whole. ^° It should also be noted that a performance stan-
dard (or a critical element) may be multiple in nature, and
the employee may be required to perform acceptably as to each
component of this standard. 1 -^' Questions bearing on this
issue might be whether the employee understood agency expec-
tations and the consequences of the employee's failure to meet
such expectations, as well as whether the appellant knew or





I n Seay v. Department of Health and Human Serv i -
an individual was removed as a claims representative
for failure to satisfy three critical elements of the position,
It was determined that there was no per se requirement to
establish quantitative criteria as to each performance stan-
dard, with standards based on such terms as "consistently" and
"often" passing muster as generally encompassing a broad range
of duties varying in complexity 140 Indeed, the validity of
performance standards is presumed, once the agency has shown
that the standards are part of a valid performance system.
If quantitative criteria are established, however, the
agency bears the burden of showing that the standard is
reasonably attainable and realistic. The Board has scrutinized
such standards rather carefully. In Rocheleau v. Securities
and Exchange Commission
,
1 ^ 1 an individual was removed from an
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investment advisors per year. The agency was considered co
have abused its discretion because the numerical requirement
was unreasonable. No individual in the office had ever con-
ducted 30 exans in one year, nor did examiners nationwide
have any quotasc 142 While the agency did attempt to show
that other examiners around the nation had averaged 40 exams,
such an average could not be related to the appellant's posi-
tion in terms of time requirements or complexity of issues. - J
It should be noted, however, that the appellant's removal
was considered to be justified because of the poor quality of
144 Also, in Walker v. Department of the Trea-his work
sury , x J an individual was removed for unacceptable perfor-
mance for failure to meet a numerical error rate requiring
the screening, logging, and distribution of 400 to 700 pieces
of correspondence per month with no more than 3 errors. While
the appellant exceeded the error rate, it was determined that
the standard was neither realistic nor reasonably attainable.
A previous standard had been in effect providing for an error
rate of no higher than 14% per month; the new standard, re-
quiring 99.5% accuracy, violated employee rights by establi-
shing a standard of near perfection which the employee would
have to meet to avoid facing adverse action. / '°
A high employee error rate, however, can be shown to be
unacceptable through substantial evidence. In Roberson v .
Department of Health and Human Services , ^^"^ a consistent em-
ployee error rate of 22% was regarded as unacceptable when it
was determined that this error rate continued during a 60 day
4 4
owarning period, with supervisor counseling every two to thrs.3
weeks. The imprecise standard could not provide for appell-
ant relief, given the agency actions taken to advise her of
what was necessary to perform acceptably; the agency, again,
is only required to use objective criteria, to the maximum
extent feasible. Similarly, in Baker v. Defense Logistics
1 4 ftAgencv ,^ g an imprecise standard reflecting the requirement
of a Mechanic Foreman to plan, schedule, and manage work,
as well as to ensure that work met acceptable levels of qual-
ity and quantity did not support the complainant's appeal when
it could be shown that the agency augmented the imprecise
standards by informing the employee of specific work require-
ments through such alternative methods as written instructions,
memoranda, and agency responses to employee questions. j'
As such, it can be seen that objective criteria need not
equate to a quantitative standard, though such standards, if
utilized, must be realistic and reasonably attainable. In
addition, agency methods of notification, particularly invol-
ving regular followups during counseling sessions, can augment
an otherwise imprecise standard to eventually support an ad-
verse action, assuming the employee has been given a reason-
able time to improve. As noted in S human , the requirement of
objectivity may generally be met by an agency with varying
degrees of specificity and objectivity in its standards,
depending on the complexity, significance, and innate sub-
jectivity of the duties which are cons idered . ^"^
•15
3. Oooortu: ;o improve
The opportunity to improve is, of course, a critical em-
ployee right under Chapter 43. 1d0 In the important MSPB
decision of Sandland v. General Services Admini strat ion , ^ D *
it was determined that, in an unacceptable performance case,
the agency had the burden of proof by substantial evidence to
show that the employee had been afforded such an opportunity.
Such a showing could be established by written memoranda of
instruction/warning, as well as by training and counseling
sessions. In Sandland , the agency failed to sustain its
burden when it was established that during the sixty day
improvement period, the appellant's supervisor informed otner
branch chiefs that the appellant would soon be removed from
any managerial position. In addition, appellant's responsi-
bilities were progressively diminished and his authority
undermined. 152 On the other hand, in Pine v. Department of
the Air Force ,°^ an individual was demoted from a GS-7
Budget Analyst to a GS-5 Aircraft Mechanic Helper. The
agency sustained its burden by substantial evidence when it
showed that the appellant had been counseled several times
before receiving a written notice of unsatisfactory perfor-
mance. In addition, the appellant was referred to education-
al resource material which could aid his performance and was
told he could seel; additional assistance from his predecessor
1
r
i Ain the Budget Analyst position. J '
A . Communication of Minimal Acceptability
In some instances, an agency may establish an appraisal
A 6
ostf
system of several tiers with respect to a standard of accepta-
ble performance. While one of the tiers nay be designated fo;
a level of successful performance, an employee may sometimes
avoid adverse action if his/her performance meets a level
below this tier. 3efore the agency may take adverse action,
it is generally necessary that the employee be advised of the
standard which must be met in order to achieve a level of
performance sufficient to warrant retention. A significant
MSPB decision, Donaldson v. Department of Labor
,
133 stated
that some specificity as to the standard is necessary ''to
provide a firm benchmark toward which the employee must aim
his/her performance, and not an elusive goal which the agen-
cy may find that the employee met or failed to meet at its
pleasure." ^ 3tl In Dona ldson , a claims examiner was improperly
demoted when the agency failed to advise of at least the
minimal requirements necessary for her to retain her position
Similarly, in Goodale v. Department of Labor , 13 an appellant
was only advised of the standard she was being measured
against at the successful level (approve and batch 40 bills
each workday), rather than of the exact figure necessary for
minimally acceptable performance. The failure to properly
advise the appellant amounted to a lack of a basis to mea-
sure her performance, thereby rendering the standard invalid.
The same result attached in Ro'iers v. Po-o.i r tnon t of Labor lj8
in which an individual was, again, not advised of what was
required to attain a minimally satisfactory or "needs im-
provement" ratinq. Since the employee's performance only had
47
co rise to such a level to warrant retention and since there
vas no reason that the agency could not have been more speci-
fic based on the nature of the performance, as measured by
the standard, the agency failed to meet the requirements of
accuracy and objectivity.
As such, it is easy to consider that the requirement of
objectivity provides that an agency advise the employee of
the minimum level of performance necessary to retain employ-
ment when the standard provides for a multi-tiered system.
Such communication to the employee may occur in the perfor-
mance improvement plan or through counseling or written in-
structions designed to advise the employee of the standards
against which (s)he is to be measured 159 Communication of
the nature of the standard is consistent with the statutory
language of 5 U.S.C. § 4302 and is not a particularly diffi-
cult chore for the agency to undertake.
C . Federal Decisions
The Board's willingness to scrutinize the substance of a
performance standard to determine whether it is improperly
absolute, or whether the agency has complied with 5 U.S.C.
§
4302 in developing an objective standard and communicating the
standard and critical elements to the employee, has been well
documented. There has not yet been such a wealth of federal
decisions in this area, although a series of recent cases may
signal more of a movement in this respect.
Perhaps the most notable recent decision in this area is
Wilson v. Dpp.i r t m--»n t of H'.ilth and Hunan Services .
48
160 In this
decision, the Federal Circuit Court reviewed in some detail the
function of the Civil Service Reform Act in providing for the
new performance appraisal system. In reviewing MSPS decisions
covering performance standards, the court discussed the objec-


















































t isf y t
ression



























































































Such a discussion clearly reflects the basis for developing
and implementing standards, and the balancing considerations
which are taken into account.
In Wilson , adverse action was taken against an individual
serving as a social insurance representative for failure to
attain a minimally acceptable performance level in the follow-
i ng standard :
Coordinates, controls, and directs activities
of subordinate staff to insure adequate service
to the public by appropriate management prin-
ciples. Assignments and instructions to staff
are hastily made and sometimes misunderstood.
Direction of work is occasionally effective in
achieving objectives. iu -
49
The ::-:: determined that the standard was much coo vague with
respect to the phrases "sometimes misunderstood", "hastily
mace", and "occasionally effective", allowing an employee to
"insure adequate service to the public." These phrases •..'ere
so imprecise as to encourage the arbitrary action that the
Civil Service Reform Act intended to avoid. Wilson would not
really oe on notice as to what was expected of her, apart
from the appraiser's own subjective evaluation. 1" The court,
in formulating a test regarding performance standards, held
that a standard should be "sufficiently precise and specific
as to invoke a general consensus as to its meaning and
content" - that is, that most people will understand what the
performance standard means and what it requires. 1 """





1 " 3 an environmental scientist responsible
for reporting on seminars and meetings of permittees and
licensees of both the EPA and similar state and local agen-
cies challenged a standard requring that reports be made in
a timely manner, address all relevant issues, and require
minimum revisions, arguing that said standard was not suf-
ficiently objective and precise. Consistent with previous
MSPD decisions in this area, the court noted that the nature
of Jackson's job as a professional required some subjective
judgment on the part of his evaluators; in addition, he had
been instructed as to how he could achieve a better rating. 1 ""




. n e ,' 1 _ s o n a n * ackson cases were relied on in two deci
sions dated 30 January 1986, We
i
ranch v. Department of the
Arnv io ; and D e o a U w v . U.S. International Trade Commission .*
In Weirauch , the court determined that a Morale Support
Officer, responsible for the operation of support shops and
recreational facilities in Aschaf f enburg , Germany, was proper-
ly advised as to the performance standards and critical ele-
ments he was required to meet, and that he was not removed
for any instances of poor performance prior to being advised
of the standard. Interestingly enough, the court stressed
that standards cannot be frozen in time and permanently en-
dorsed, but instead must be constantly reviewed as experience
in developing them is gained and evaluation techniques are
improved.*" 1^ In Dopauw , an individual working as a commodi-
ty-industry analyst challenged the objectivity and propriety
of a standard stating:
Usually identifies and anticipates problems and
takes corrective action; usually meets requirements
for questionnaire construction and data collection
to support project; meets all statutory deadlines
and usually meets other deadlines; reports are
substantially complete with few errors and require
few extensive changes due to omissions or lack
of analys is . -• ' ^
Such a standard was deemed to be minimally acceptable, utili-
zing the Jackson ( supra , p. 50) criteria in which work govern-
ing a professional employee will often require a subjective
evaluation. In addition, Depauw was well advised by his
superiors of what was expected of him in attaining an accepta-
ble level of performance.- 7 - The standard, therefore, was
consistent with th~* statute.
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An additional federal case concerns the previously noted
MSPB decision in 3ak?r v. refer.s; Logistics Agency l7 ~
( supra , p. 45). In this cas^. the Federal Circuit Court
sustained the Board's decision that an agency had established
perforr.ar.ee standards based on objective criteria, to the
maximum extent feasible. The standards had reflected that
the employee must be "normally familiar with most of the on-
going vork of the organization" and must "in most cases
assure that the work vas completed on time." In addition, the
employee vas required to meet a standard stating that "the
work unit usually meets deadlines and the quality of work is
usually acceptable." 17 ^ The presiding official in this
case had attempted to rigidly quantify the terms "most" and
"usually" in finding that -he employee, in a bare majority of
cases, met performance standards for the minimally accepta-
ble level of performance. The court, in sustaining the Board's
reversal of the presiding official's determination, found
such rigidity inappropriate, particularly when it was shown
that the agency had made otherwise imprecise standards more
specific through instructions and memoranda. The court noted
that a very rigid approach in such instances could allow for
the retention of employees who do not otherwise meet a mini-
mally acceptable level of performance. '
^
One further recent federal decision in this area, citing
W i I s o
n
with approval, is AdKins v. Popg r tnon t of Housing and
Urban Dove lonrmnt 175 In this case, an individual had failed
to attain a satisfactory level of performance with regard to
5 2
the subelement of "typing output", although he performed
acceptably as to the four other subelements of the critical
"typing" element (the other four subelements being typing
priorities are followed; typing is accurate; typing product
is neat and clean; and supervisor is promptly notified when
reguirements cannot be net). 1 ° The 3oard had affirmed his
removal for unacceptable performance pursuant to Chapter 43.
The court also affirmed the removal, applying the Shuman
( supra , p. 42) holding that when a "performance standard for
a critical element consists of more than one subelement, an
employee may be reguired to perform acceptably with respect
to each subelement or subelements of the performance standard
for a critical element." l77 In this instance, substantial
evidence was presented justifying an unacceptable rating on
the critical element as a whole because the appellant, Ad-
kins, had been advised by memoranda of the significance and
dominance of the "typing output" suDelement (indeed, his out-
put reguirement had been lowered from two pages an hour to
one page an hour, part\ally to accommodate his handicap of
epilepsy) and his deficiency in this area was not counter-
balanced by acceptable performance in the other subelements
of the critical "typing element." 17 "
As such, the federal circuit court cases, similar to the
MSPB, reflect a willingness to scrutinize the performance
standard, v/hile still providing the agency with the oppor-
tunity to show that the employee's performance has been un-




tive if the standard passes the W i L s o
n
"general consensus"
test ( supra , p. 50) and if the procedural requirements as to
communication of minimal acceptability and opportunity to
improve are afforded.
As noted, such federal cases, in evaluating performance
standards, augment analyses developed in MSPB decisions over
the past several years. Before leaving this area, it is
appropriate to discuss one of the more recent MSPB cases,
Alexander v. Department of Commerce , 17 " which deals with
performance standards and incorporates many of the previous-
ly discussed factors. In Alexander , an individual was demo-
ted from a GS-9 Employee Relations Specialist to a GS-4
Patent Copy Inspection Clerk because of unacceptable perfor-
mance in four critical elements of his position. He chall-
enged the following portion of a supplemental written
performance standard:
Satisfactory : No more than two valid pro-
blems are noted in: oral or written respon-
ses concerning regulations, union contract
or policy; or complaints concerning slow
response time; or failure to assimilate
and/or transmit supervisory policy guidance. 1^
Utilizing the above-cited Wilson test, the Board noted that
the standard was sufficiently precise in that most people
would realize from reading the standard that the agency is
referring to substantive problems of accuracy, timeliness,
and gathering and transmitting information. 1 ^ 1 The appell-
ant's position required some subjective judgment by employers







measurement; instead/ the job required the ''judicious use of
thought processes and the ability to make decisions; aware-
ness of regulations, administrative orders, the Federal Per-
sonnel Manual, statutes, administrative instructions and
union contracts; and the ability to apply this guidance to
various questions." 1 ^^ Furthermore, the appellant had been
advised as to what was required of him by written memoranda
and was given an opportunity to improve before adverse action
was taken. Finally, the claimant argued that the standard
was absolute because it allowed for only two valid problems
at the satisfactory level. The Board dismissed this argu-
ment, citing the Callaway holding that an absolute standard
would provide that one incident of poor performance would
result in an unsatisfactory rating on a job element
.
^°^
Alexander aptly embraces the factors relating to perfor-
mance standards which have generated disputes between the
agency and employee - that is, absoluteness, objectivity,
specificity, attainability, and reasonableness. In so doing,
the Board cites the key Board decisions which have addressed
these factors in the past, as well as the critical Wi lson
decision which will most likely be relied on in the future,








D . Performance Standard Conclusions
As previously set forth, two important questions might be
considered, given the recent decisions on performance stan-
dards. The first question concerns whether more grievants
will seek MSPB review rather than arbitration in adverse ac-
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tion casas because of bhe Board's willingness to examine the
substance of a performance standard and an arbitrator's per-
ceived wariness to do so because of the previously noted con-
straints applied by the FLRA in negotiability cases (with
such wariness conceivably being transferred to the arbitra-
tor's treatment of an adverse action case). It is considered
that in the past, most employees have sought arbitration
because of a perception that the individual arbitrator, in in-
terpreting the contract, might be more sympathetic to the
individual employee's concerns. It is suggested however,
that the combination of Board decisions and federal cases,-
reflecting more of a willingness to become involved in the
substance of a standard, may result in an increase of employ-
ees who seek MSPB review. The route chosen, however, might
be somewhat less significant given the Wi lson , Depauw , Wei -
rauch , and Adkins decisions since federal review is available
as to either the MSPB or arbitration vehicles; if the standard
does pot meet the Wilson criteria, specifically the "general
consensus" test, adverse action may very well be overturned.
Furthermore, the arbitral remedy will most likely be sustained
if the arbitrator, as required, has considered appropriate
federal law, regulations, and contractual provisions in ren-
dering his award.
Secondly, it is possible that agencies may elect to proceed
with adverse actions under an efficiency of the service basis,
pursuant to Chapter 75, given increased federal court and MSPB
scrutiny of performance standards under Chapter 43. L o v s h i n
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v. Deoar:,-".en: of z'r.e !iavv certainly gives the agency that
option, albeit with the necessity of sustaining, m theory,
a higher burden of proof. The agency, however, must na!<e the
decision a_ priori , rather than have the 3oard or courts re-
consider a Chapter 75 option if Chapter 43 action fails. 1 ^^
Each Chapter has different procedures to follow, and the
agency would be well advised to have its priorities well
established before deciding which avenue to pursue.
VI . CONCLUSION
As can be seen?4 agency discretion has been generally
broadened in taking adverse action. The agency may choose
to proceed under Chapter 43 or Chapter 75, and, in security
clearance natters, will have almost complete discretion if
due process concerns are adhered to. Performance standards
remain a dynamic and flexible area. The agency must ensure
that the standard is validly established and communicated,
and be prepared to defend a larger number of claims relating
to objectivity and attainability, particularly given the in-
crease of Board and court decisions in this area. Yet the
performance appraisal system remains evolutionary in nature,
and, with increased agency experience in developing and
applying standards, va 1 id grievances may possibly decline.
During this evolutionary period, the Board and Federal Circuit
Court, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act, have
established some fairly firm guideposts for both the agency
and employee to follow, albeit the Lovshi n decision should
remain open to criticism for its failure to defer to the Board - 7 /'* 1
57 ' r-
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of Prists . In any event, it is considered that in most all
\
personnel natters, the increased agency discretion sought to
be attained through the Civil Service Reform Act will have
been achieved, with, of course, the attendant concern for
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